What did the government know?

The government knew

Last updated 7 October 2026 · 49 documented meetings

The government's own letters and documents show that the state discussed the risks in Myanmar with Telenor as early as January 2013, that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs knew about the surveillance equipment seven weeks before the coup, that Prime Minister Erna Solberg was registered as an insider in the case on 9 March 2021, and that the Støre government knew about the data disclosures to the military junta before the sale was approved. Even so, the state set no requirements.

Here are the 49 meetings, the dates and what the documents show, taken from the letters the Prime Minister, the Minister of Trade and Industry and the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent to the Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs between November 2025 and January 2026, and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' own correspondence with Telenor.

The facts are taken from the letters of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Trade and Industry and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' correspondence with Telenor and its insider list in the case. Assessments marked «Prydz believes» are the author's own.

Forrådt av NorgeThe full story of how Norway helped Telenor into Myanmar. Over 400 source references. Signed by the author. Order

From the Foreign Ministry's own documents

1. 01 30 insiders

   Ministry of Foreign Affairs insider list, 5 July 2021

   The Prime Minister was on the insider list in March 2021

   The Ministry of Foreign Affairs kept an insider list for «Project Telenor Myanmar» under the Securities Trading Act. The list was sent to Telenor's legal department on 25 March 2021 and updated in June and July. The version of 5 July 2021 lists 30 people in the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries and the Office of the Prime Minister. What the inside information concerned is redacted.

   In five days, the knowledge spread from the Foreign Ministry to the Prime Minister:

   • 4 March 2021 at 09:30 – Foreign Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide, Director General Helge Seland of the Legal Affairs Department and eleven other Foreign Ministry officials are registered as insiders.
   • 8 March 2021 – Director General Jan Tore Føsund and five others in the Ownership Department and communications section of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, and two in the Foreign Ministry's communications unit. Reason: «Preparation of press preparedness in connection with meeting with Telenor 9 March 2021».
   • 9 March 2021 – State Secretary Jens Frølich Holte and two others in the Foreign Ministry. Around 17:31, State Secretary Ingvild Stub at the Office of the Prime Minister and Prime Minister Erna Solberg follow. Reason: «Receipt of press preparedness in connection with meeting with Telenor 9 March 2021».
   • 25 June and 5 July 2021 – four more in the Foreign Ministry after new meetings with Telenor.

   The sale of Telenor Myanmar was announced four months later, on 8 July 2021.

   The Prime Minister's reply to the scrutiny committee of 20 November 2025 does not mention the insider list. Asked when the Office of the Prime Minister became aware of the matter, the reply begins with an inquiry on 9 July 2021. The office is said to have learned of the surveillance issue «in mid-February 2022». Støre has left questions about the Solberg government to the civil service.

   Prydz believes the Storting is entitled to know what the Prime Minister was told on 9 March 2021, and why it is not in the reply to the scrutiny committee.

2. 02 Access refused

   Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 2022

   The Foreign Ministry asked Telenor for reasons to refuse public access

   When the Foreign Ministry received a request in June 2022 for access to its correspondence with Telenor about the Myanmar sanctions, it asked Telenor to assess what had to be withheld. It is normal for the administration to consult a third party about trade secrets before granting access. But the ministry also wrote (our translation): «We would appreciate it if you could also send us reasons that allow us to defend a possible refusal».

   Telenor replied the next day that, in the company's view, all correspondence between Telenor and the Foreign Ministry on the matter «must be exempted from public access».

   Prydz believes it is striking that the ministry asked the company concerned for arguments to deny the public access.

What the answers show

1. 03 21 meetings before the coup

   Minister of Trade and Industry, 13 January 2026

   The risks were on the table from the first meeting

   From January 2013 to December 2020, Myanmar was on the agenda of at least 21 dated meetings between the ministry and Telenor. Topics included human rights, the authorities' access to the mobile network, corruption, network shutdowns, ethnic conflicts and reports that the military had used Telenor's towers.

   Prydz believes this undermines the picture of the state as a passive shareholder with no insight into the risks.

   • Trade Minister's letter, 13 January 2026PDF
2. 04 Not raised

   Ministers of Trade and Industry and of Foreign Affairs

   The risk of a coup was not raised

   The Minister of Trade and Industry writes that the political situation was discussed in the meetings with Telenor in autumn 2020, but that «the risk of a possible coup was not raised» (our translation).

   The Foreign Ministry writes that rumours of a coup had circulated several times, but that a coup was considered «very unlikely». When the military threatened to take power in the last days of January 2021, the impression was that the parties would reach an amicable solution.

   Prydz believes the owner should have asked for a coup plan in a country where the military still held considerable power.

   • Trade Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
   • Foreign Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
3. 05 14 December 2020

   Minister of Foreign Affairs, 20 November 2025

   The Foreign Ministry knew about the surveillance equipment before the coup

   Telenor told the Foreign Ministry about the installed and tested surveillance system on 14 December 2020, seven weeks before the coup. The public learned of it through Telenor's press release of 15 September 2021, nine months later.

   • Foreign Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
4. 06 No guidance

   Minister of Trade and Industry

   The state asked about deleting customer data, but set no requirements

   After the coup, the ministry asked Telenor about the options for deleting customer data, switching off the network and alternatives to a sale. But «The state as owner does not give instructions or orders in the ownership dialogue», the minister writes (our translation). According to her, an instruction to delete customer data would have «risked incurring legal liability for the state» for abuses against employees.

   Prydz believes the owner had both the opportunity and the responsibility to require that customer data be protected.

   • Trade Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
   • Trade Minister's letter, 13 January 2026PDF
5. 07 February 2022

   Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Trade and Industry

   The Støre government knew about the data disclosures before the sale was approved

   In February 2022, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries learned that Telenor Myanmar had complied with the military regime's orders to disclose telecom data (metadata). On 20 February 2022, Foreign Minister Anniken Huitfeldt learned that Telenor had received orders to share historical data. The sale was approved on 18 March and completed on 25 March 2022.

   As early as 19 November 2021, Telenor mentioned a possible onward sale to a local company to the Foreign Ministry, and Shwe Byain Phyu was named. The United States has since imposed sanctions on the company.

   Prydz believes the government had both the knowledge and the time to act before the sale was completed.

   • Foreign Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
   • Trade Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
6. 08 Withheld

   Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs

   The documents are still being withheld

   Since October 2025 the scrutiny committee has asked for the documents from the ownership dialogue. The government has replied with summaries and a confidential annex, but not with the documents themselves. On 24 September 2026 the Prime Minister refused again. See the status of the scrutiny case.

   • Prime Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
   • Trade Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
   • Foreign Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
   • Prime Minister's reply, 3 December 2025PDF
   • Trade Minister's reply, 3 December 2025PDF
   • Foreign Minister's reply, 3 December 2025PDF
   • Trade Minister's letter, 13 January 2026PDF

The Stoltenberg government (until October 2013)

1. 09 4 meetings

   Ministry of Trade and Industry

   Myanmar risks were discussed before the licence was awarded

   According to the trade minister's letter of 13 January 2026, Myanmar was on the agenda of these meetings between the ministry and Telenor in 2013, before the change of government:

   • 18 January 2013 – annual corporate responsibility meeting: the risk picture and risk assessments for a possible entry into Myanmar
   • 14 March 2013 – quarterly meeting: industry initiative on human rights, the company's risk assessment and the licence process
   • 16 May 2013 – quarterly meeting: competition for the licences
   • 30 August 2013 – quarterly meeting: new telecom law, earnings potential and risk

   What the answers show: the state was informed about the risks in Myanmar as early as January 2013, before the licence was awarded.

   • Trade Minister's letter, 13 January 2026PDF

The Solberg government (2013–2021)

1. 10 7 meetings

   Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries

   Entry 2013–2014: human rights, corruption and network access

   • 13 November 2013 – quarterly meeting: the licence process and the human rights situation, including access to the network
   • 14 March 2014 – quarterly meeting: progress, corporate responsibility including land rights and facilitation payments, business prospects
   • 13 May 2014 – quarterly meeting: infrastructure, towers and property rights
   • 27 May 2014 – Minister of Trade and Industry Monica Mæland meets Telenor: among other things corruption, regulation and land rights
   • 5 September 2014 – quarterly meeting: competitors' experiences and communicating corporate responsibility challenges
   • 9 October 2014 – annual corporate responsibility meeting: climate, environment and procurement for the investment
   • 12 November 2014 – quarterly meeting: experiences from the start-up and the company's approach to due diligence

   • Trade Minister's letter, 13 January 2026PDF
2. 11 10 meetings

   Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries

   2015–2020: network shutdowns, ethnic conflicts and military use of towers

   • 5 March 2015 – quarterly meeting: new telecom law and the authorities' access to the network
   • 25 June 2015 – quarterly meeting: the regulatory framework and the political situation
   • 27 August 2015 – quarterly meeting: labour rights and corruption
   • 28 August 2015 – Mæland meets the chair and CEO: corruption, working conditions and network shutdowns
   • 6 December 2017 – Mæland meets the chair and CEO: internally displaced people in Myanmar
   • 6 February 2018 – quarterly meeting: the macro situation and ethnic conflicts
   • 22 March 2018 – Minister of Trade and Industry Torbjørn Røe Isaksen meets the chair and CEO: website shutdowns and the treatment of ethnic minorities
   • 21 November 2019 – annual sustainability meeting: integrity due diligence
   • 11 November 2020 – quarterly meeting: the authorities' SIM card re-registration
   • 9 December 2020 – annual sustainability meeting: compliance and risk management

   In 2019 and 2020, reports that Telenor Myanmar's towers had been used by the military, and website shutdowns, were also raised in the ownership dialogue.

   About the meetings in autumn 2020, the trade minister writes: «The risk of a possible coup was not raised» (our translation).

   • Trade Minister's letter, 13 January 2026PDF
   • Trade Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
3. 12 14 December 2020

   Ministry of Foreign Affairs

   The Foreign Ministry learns of the surveillance equipment

   Telenor informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14 December 2020 that Telenor Myanmar had installed and tested equipment for a lawful intercept gateway (LIG). The system gives the authorities access to monitor and intercept telecommunications and traffic data, in this case also in real time.

   According to Telenor, the equipment was installed before the ban on transferring such equipment was added to the Myanmar sanctions regulations in 2018.

   The public learned of the equipment through Telenor's press release of 15 September 2021. According to the Prime Minister, the Office of the Prime Minister became aware of the matter «in mid-February 2022».

   What the answers show: the Foreign Ministry knew about the surveillance equipment seven weeks before the coup and nine months before the public.

   • Foreign Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
   • Prime Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
4. 13 8 meetings

   Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries

   After the coup: the Nybø meetings

   • 16 February 2021 – Minister of Trade and Industry Iselin Nybø meets the chair and CEO: longer-term options and the state's expectations as owner
   • 7 April 2021 – Nybø meets the chair and CEO: whether anything had changed in Telenor's assessments
   • 28 May 2021 – quarterly meeting: Telenor's dialogue with the new regime and a new telecom law
   • 8 June 2021 – video call on the situation and the options
   • 24 June 2021 – meeting on the situation and the options
   • 30 June 2021 – Nybø meets the chair and CEO
   • 24 August 2021 – quarterly meeting
   • 14 September 2021 – video meeting

   Telenor told the ministry that after the coup Telenor Myanmar was no longer allowed to be open about orders from the regime, and that the company had no choice but to comply with any orders. Through spring 2021 Telenor reported growing pressure to activate the surveillance equipment. The ministry asked, among other things, about the options for deleting customer data and the consequences for local employees. The sale to M1 Group was announced on 8 July 2021.

   On 4 October 2021 Nybø wrote to the Storting (our translation): «The ministry, and I, have since February held several meetings with Telenor's chair and management about the situation in Myanmar, and the ministry has been concerned that the company makes thorough assessments of the very difficult issues that have arisen.»

   What the answers show: as early as spring 2021, the owner knew the regime was pushing to have the surveillance equipment activated.

   • Trade Minister's letter, 13 January 2026PDF
   • Trade Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
5. 14 9 meetings

   Ministry of Foreign Affairs

   Sanctions and staff safety: nine meetings with the Foreign Ministry in 2021

   After the coup, Telenor met the Foreign Ministry on 12 and 16 February, 9 March, 25 June, 5 July, 6 September, 13 September and 7 and 13 October 2021. The main topics were staff safety and the Myanmar sanctions.

   The ministry said no licences would be granted for supplying equipment and services related to surveillance technology. At the meeting on 7 October 2021, Telenor mentioned public concern about the transfer of customer and traffic data.

   On 29 March 2021 the Foreign Ministry advised against all travel to Myanmar.

   • Foreign Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF

The Støre government (from October 2021)

1. 15 7 meetings

   Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries

   The Vestre meetings and the news of the data disclosures

   • 29 October 2021 – Minister of Trade and Industry Jan Christian Vestre meets the chair and CEO
   • 8 November 2021 – quarterly meeting
   • 19 November 2021 – video meeting
   • 21 November 2021 – Vestre meets the chair
   • 23 November 2021 – annual sustainability meeting
   • 10 February 2022 – quarterly meeting
   • 16 February 2022 – Vestre meets the chair and CEO

   The meetings focused on employees, customers, the sale process and the demand to activate the surveillance equipment. The ministry asked, among other things, about the options for switching off the network, deleting data and alternatives to a sale.

   In February 2022 Telenor told the ministry that Telenor Myanmar had complied with orders from the military regime to disclose telecom data (metadata). According to the trade minister, the main content was «shared with a wider part of the Støre government» (our translation).

   On 16 February 2022 Vestre told the Storting's question time (our translation): «We make sure that the matter is clarified and that the company makes its own assessments properly, but as I said there are no easy answers, and based on the principles of corporate governance and the division of roles in company law, it is the board of Telenor that handles this.»

   • Trade Minister's letter, 13 January 2026PDF
   • Trade Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
2. 16 3 meetings

   Ministry of Foreign Affairs

   Shwe Byain Phyu and the order to share historical data

   • 19 November 2021 – Telenor informs about a possible onward sale from M1 Group to a local company. Shwe Byain Phyu Group is mentioned.
   • 15 February 2022 – Telenor says M1 Group is expected to sell a stake to Shwe Byain Phyu after the purchase. The ministry is «informed specifically that Telenor had difficulties protecting customer data adequately in Myanmar» (our translation).
   • 20 February 2022 – meeting with Foreign Minister Anniken Huitfeldt. Telenor says the company has received orders from the military regime to share historical data.

   The sale was approved on 18 March and completed on 25 March 2022.

   What the answers show: the Foreign Minister was told of the order 26 days before the sale was approved.

   • Foreign Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
3. 17 Forwarded

   Office of the Prime Minister

   Letters to the Prime Minister were passed on

   From 9 July 2021 the Office of the Prime Minister received a number of letters about the sale from organisations and individuals. Several were forwarded to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries.

   In February 2022 the President of Myanmar's exile government, the National Unity Government, wrote to the Prime Minister. According to the committee, the exile government said it had rejected the sale. The letter was forwarded to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries and raised at a meeting between the Foreign Ministry and the exile government in March 2022.

   The Office of the Prime Minister learned of the surveillance issue «in mid-February 2022». Støre writes that he has been concerned that the matter «is handled with the seriousness it requires, and in line with the established division of responsibilities between ministers» (our translation).

   Prydz believes the Office of the Prime Minister knew both of the exile government's rejection and of the surveillance issue before the sale was approved, and should have intervened.

   • Prime Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
4. 18 Reported in 2023

   Ministry of Foreign Affairs

   The Foreign Ministry reported Telenor to the police in 2023

   On 15 June 2023 the Foreign Ministry reported Telenor for breaching the ban on transferring equipment and technical assistance for communications surveillance under the Myanmar sanctions. The report was based on information Telenor itself had given in meetings with the ministry and in self-reporting. PST dropped the case.

   In September 2026 Telenor ASA was charged with breaching sanctions legislation. See the status of the criminal cases.

   • Foreign Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF

The scrutiny case 2025–2026

1. 19 Answers without documents

   Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs

   The committee asked for everything. It got summaries.

   • 22 October 2025 – the committee asks the Prime Minister, the trade minister and the foreign minister for answers and all documentation
   • 20 November 2025 – the three answer the committee's questions, but withhold the documents from the ownership dialogue and internal documents
   • 26 November 2025 – the committee asks again for the documents
   • 3 December 2025 – the Office of the Prime Minister has found government documents from the Støre government, but the facts are placed in a confidential annex. The Attorney General's assessments are withheld. The Foreign Ministry shares six documents from Telenor, but they remain confidential.
   • 16 December 2025 – the committee asks again for the ownership dialogue
   • 13 January 2026 – the trade minister lists the meetings but does not hand over the documents. The Office of the Auditor General may review them.

   On 24 September 2026 the Prime Minister refused again. See the status of the scrutiny case.

   • Prime Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
   • Trade Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
   • Foreign Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
   • Prime Minister's reply, 3 December 2025PDF
   • Trade Minister's reply, 3 December 2025PDF
   • Foreign Minister's reply, 3 December 2025PDF
   • Trade Minister's letter, 13 January 2026PDF
2. 20 Left to the civil service

   The Prime Minister and the ministers

   Today's ministers have not seen the Solberg-era documents

   Støre writes that, in line with established practice, he has not «requested or wanted access to internal documents at the Office of the Prime Minister concerning the previous prime minister and government» (our translation). The trade and foreign ministers have done the same. Questions about the Solberg government have been left to the civil service.

   About his own government, Støre writes that he sees no reason «to go into the government's internal processes or any internal assessments the government may have made».

   The trade ministry also writes that Telenor's specific risk assessments were not presented to the ministry.

   What the answers show: the government tells us what Telenor said in the meetings, but not what the government itself assessed.

   • Prime Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
   • Foreign Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
   • Trade Minister's reply, 20 November 2025PDF
   • Trade Minister's letter, 13 January 2026PDF
3. 21 Rejects

   Minister of Trade and Industry, 13 January 2026

   «A rather inaccurate description»

   The committee chair suggested that Telenor's entry into Myanmar was made possible by means only the state has. Minister of Trade and Industry Cecilie Myrseth replies that this is «a rather inaccurate description» (our translation).

   At the same time she writes that the Norwegian authorities wanted to support developments in the country, and that the Norwegian Communications Authority (Nkom) helped Myanmar develop telecom regulation based on Western standards. «In such cases, the Norwegian authorities act as an authority and international donor, not as a shareholder», she writes.

   Prydz believes, and documents in the book, that the state's role in Telenor's path into Myanmar went far beyond what an ordinary shareholder does.

   • Trade Minister's letter, 13 January 2026PDF